What drives workers to seek information from their peers? And how does communication a ect employee performance? Answers have proven elusive due to problems obtaining precise measures of white collar output and of observing the information individuals consume. We address these questions using an original panel data set that includes all accesses to an information-sharing platform, together with performance measures of all loan o cers at a major Japanese bank. This paper makes three contributions. First, we show that skill level di erences, job rotation, and differences among branches each a ect the demand for information. There also exists substitution between an agent's ability and the amount of information consumed. Low skill agents bene t the most from consuming others' information. Second, restricting attention to o cers who switched branches, we show that they perform on average signi cantly worse than before the switch, suggesting that job rotation destroys specialized human capital. We also nd that an o cer who shares information increases his chances of promotion rather than competes for promotion less e ectively. Third, we measure the size of productivity gains based on consuming shared information. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity over time, between branches, and among o cers, a standard deviation increase in information access increases performance by roughly ten percent. By instrumenting the demand for information with the exogenous variation arising from cultural di erences among branches, we are able to assess the causal e ect of communication on performance.
Introduction
A recurrent economic problem in organizations is how to use available knowledge eciently. Information, however, is often dispersed among agents, which prevents optimal decisions if communication is absent. One important consequence is that organizations operating in markets requiring specialized knowledge can underperform. Credit, insurance, and nancial markets are but a few examples. Agents might, in fact, decline a loan to a reliable client or fail to identify the appropriate risk class for a new client. Instead, when communication is available, agents can acquire information from co-workers in the organization. As Hayek (1945) pointed out: \it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality."
In the same spirit, Arrow's 1974 seminal work on the limits of organization argues that one key activity of any organization is internal communication. He has also pointed out that the trade-o between the cost of communication and the bene t of communication lies at the core of the agenda of organizations.
The e ects of improved communication on productivity are in fact not obvious ex ante. On the one hand, low-skill agents may ask others for direction, thus communication might improve performance through a learning e ect. On the other hand, high-skill agents might spend a larger fraction of their time helping others, which could negatively a ect their performance, via a substitution e ect as they swap information provision tasks for work completion tasks. Furthermore, even when production and use of information are not explicitly rewarded, a strategic motive might drive agents away from e ciency. Consider a high-skill worker facing the opportunity to share his knowledge with others. He might use this as an instrument to signal his ability in order to increase his chances of promotion. Alternatively he might prefer to hoard his knowledge to prevent a competitor from overtaking him on the ladder to promotion. Similarly, a low-skill worker might be reluctant to ask others for information required to complete his tasks out of fear of revealing his low ability. There exists then an internal job market signaling e ect on behalf of high ability and a adverse selection e ect on behalf of low ability workers, which in uences agents' decisions. These e ects are summarized in Table 1 where diagonal entries represent causal e ects and o -diagonal entries represent selection e ects. Finally, it is challenging to empirically disentangle the e ects of communication versus those of innate ability regarding an agent's performance and demand for information.
The e ect of knowledge sharing has recently attracted scholars' attention as one of main factors driving consumption and saving decisions (Moretti (2011) and Du o and Saez (2003)), the creation of new technologies (Ja e et al. (1993) ) and adoption of technology (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) ; Kremer and Miguel (2007) ; Conley and Udry (2010) ). Our study extends this literature by empirically investigating how information sharing and communication a ect workers' productivity within a large organization.
Moreover, by doing so we are also able to understand what drives the workers' demand for information. We analyze these issues within the corporate division of a global bank primarily located in Japan. Starting in 2003, the bank implemented an online platform to allow employees to access information from headquarters and to share their private information with each other. Every employee gained online access to documents provided by headquarters as well as the ability to pose questions of and provide answers to other employees. Adopting this new technology allowed for more e cient communication, both vertically, between headquarters and bank branches, and horizontally among loan o cers.
Information provided by bank headquarters mainly concerns legal and taxation issues, new nancial instruments and services provided by the organization, and general policy guidelines as well as details about the most successful management practices to adopt. The information exchanged by loan o cers is more often related to clients, for example, account management, credit worthiness, deal closure, collecting debts, and avoiding defaults. This provides us with a natural environment in which to understand how communication, and information sharing generally, a ects productivity.
We exploit two unique properties of our dataset. First, we have very detailed data on the performance of each loan o cer inside the bank for the two-year period 2006-2008. We observe the individual-level targets set by bank headquarters and the results achieved by each o cer along a number of di erent dimensions, such as gross pro t, loan volume and revenues. Since these measures are expressed in yen and easily quanti able, the performance of the agents on these dimensions constitutes our objective performance measure. However, we also collected the branch manager's evaluations of each loan o cer's performance on softer more informal dimensions, such as his or her contributions to branch operations and customer service. These evaluations can be interpreted as subjective performance measures because they are not directly related to the attainment of a pre-determined target. Moreover, as reported by the bankers these evaluations try to correct for luck and to reward o cers' e ort.
Second, we are able to exploit a source of exogenous variation coming from an anticorruption law that requires loan o cers to switch branches every two to ve years.
This allows us to use an instrumental variable procedure in order to assess the causal e ect of information sharing on employees' productivity. Moreover, our results are not contaminated by incentive considerations, in fact, there is no material incentive to use the new technology. Hence, if acquiring knowledge from others became an important part of the loan o cer's job, it is exclusively due to the reliability and the productivity bene ts of access to available information. Furthermore, the banking sector in Japan is very di erent from that in the United States. In particular, the incentive system implemented by this bank provides loan o cers with only de minimus end-of-the-year bonuses, so incentives are almost exclusively constituted by the possibility of promotion.
This paper provides two main sets of results. First, exploiting the longitudinal dimension of our data, we are able to identify a signi cant positive e ect of information sharing on performance. Moreover, we also highlight what is the main mechanism through which communication a ects performance. We provide evidence that low-skill agents bene t the most from acquiring information from others. The magnitude of the e ect is large and signi cant. In fact, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity over time, between branches and among o cers, a standard deviation increase in information access increases performance by more than ten percent. This supports the idea that agents might under-perform because they are not aware of more successful management practices implemented elsewhere or lack the information necessary to ll the gap (Bloom et al. (2011) ).
We can also conclude that asking questions and providing answers to others is mainly driven by innate ability, as captured by individual xed e ects. Intuitively, low-ability agents, in an attempt to improve their performance, are more likely to ask questions to their peers. Interestingly, we also show suggestive evidence that the likelihood of being promoted is positively associated with the information o cers produce (e.g. number of answers posted) and negatively a ected by how much information o cers acquire (e.g. number of questions posted). This evidence, albeit not conclusive, suggests that a signaling motive might be present.
Second, we exploit the source of exogenous variation by restricting attention to agents who switched branches. We can study how job rotation a ects (1) the demand for information and (2) the o cers' performance. We nd that they tend to increase their demand for information immediately after switching jobs. However, this e ect declines over time. That job rotation increases information demand supports the hypothesis that learning is a major factor a ecting performance. Intuitively, when a loan o cer is forced to switch branches, he does not possess, for example, the knowledge of the local market conditions to assess the reliability of new clients. Without the ability to communicate with more experienced o cers, whom he also has trouble identifying, an o cer's productivity can su er.
Restricting our attention to \switchers," gives us the opportunity to investigate their performances in the new branches. We nd strong evidence that switching negatively affects their performance and, after the switch, they perform on average signi cantly worse than before. This result is of independent interest as it suggests specialized human capital is destroyed when they move to a di erent branch. This is surprising because we are considering the same worker within the same organization, controlling for regional and branch di erences. This nding contributes to the labor literature on the accumulation and destruction of specialized human capital and the e ect of worker displacement. 1 As we discuss in section 6, this presents us with an opportunity to quantify and bound the costs associated with the anti-corruption law.
Finally, we further exploit the mandatory switching of loan o cers across branches in order to assess the causal e ect of communication and information sharing on performance. Motivated by branch variation in usage of the information-sharing platform, we construct an instrument based upon the attitudes of a branch towards the new technology. For each o cer i; our instrument is the amount of information accessed in the previous branch excluding o cer i: That is, if speci c o cer A works in a branch where problems are usually resolved within the branch and without attempting to nd the solutions elsewhere in the organization, then when o cer A moves to a di erent branch, he will tend to communicate less with other o cers in other branches. In contrast, if o cer A works for a branch where access to information provided by others is encouraged, he will tend to communicate more across the organization when in the new branch.
We nd even stronger results than those found with the estimation of the longitudinal model. This provides further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there exists substitution between the loan o cers' ability and the amount of information to which they have access. Moreover, this suggests that in contrast to the o-ring theory formulated by Kremer (1993) , which predicts that the productivity of each worker is increasing in the skill level of his co-workers, we nd an asymmetric e ect. While we observe that the opportunity to share information with high-skill workers increases the low-skill workers' productivity, we do not observe any negative e ect on the high-skill workers' performance.
The signi cance of our instrument suggests that agents take into account their peers' behavior, when deciding how to cope with their daily tasks. For example, suppose loan o cer A is facing a taxation issue with one of his corporate clients. Our results show that, not only he will be more inclined to ask questions if he has underperformed in the past (i.e. indicating a low-ability agent), but he will be more inclined to do so if his peers behave in the same way. That is, there exists a complementarity in information sharing: the higher the number of o cers who consult their colleagues, the higher is the incentive for each of them to continue sharing information. This might be explained by the absence of competition and the lower risk of being identi ed as a low-ability agent which based on having provided information. 2 Moreover, we show that it is more likely for o cer A to meet his targets and improve his performance, by solving his taxation issue with the help of others, than by taking an uninformed decision.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section places this paper in relation to existing literature. Section 2 discusses the institutional background, and describes our data. Section 3 explains our approach and the methodology we employ to estimate the e ect of information sharing on performance. Section 4 presents the main results for the e ect of communication on performance, promotions, and the e ect of switching on information demand and productivity. Section 5 presents the results of our instrumental variable estimates. Section 6 analyzes the relevance of our results for three di erent issues: cost of regulation, theory of tournaments, and relational banking. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Related Literature
Since Marschak and Radner (1972) pioneering work, team theory has theoretically investigated issues similar to our own and the literature has developed around the idea that information ows, and not just incentives, drive agents' behaviors inside an organization. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) Recently Bloom and Reenen (2007) and Bloom and Reenen (2010) surveyed 732 medium-sized manufacturing rms in four countries, collecting data on their management
and Van Zandt (1999) which highlight the importance of hierarchies to diminish the costs related to processing information that ows through the network of contacts. 4 Another related paper in this strand of the literature is Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) . Niehaus (2011) considers homogeneous agents, who share their knowledge with peers whenever private bene ts exceed communication costs.
5 See Syverson (2004) for a in-depth analysis of the productivity dispersion in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Abraham and White (2006) and Foster et al. (2008) , among others, study the evolution of productivity over time. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) present an earlier survey on productivity, while Syverson (2010) focuses on the recent contributions in this area that attempt to explain why businesses di er in their measured productivity levels.
6 See Gibbons and Henderson (2010) and Gibbons (2010) for surveys of the literature on performance di erences across similar enterprises.
practices regarding operations, monitoring, targets, and incentives. The implementation of these practices is highly correlated with its total factor productivity. On one hand, the nature of our data limits the analysis to one bank but, on the other, it allows us to employ the same ne-grained performance measures used by headquarters to assess loan o cers' performances and to avoid problems related to survey data. 7 In contrast to Bloom and Reenen (2007) , our main focus is the analysis of the e ects of the information generated within the organization on white collar productivity.
Our paper is also related to the strand of the literature that examines the importance of technological adoption in increasing productivity, such as Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) , Faggio et al. (2010) , and Aral et al. (2007) . Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) document case studies where IT enhances the speed with which rms can replicate practices they nd productive in one of their lines of business across the entire organization. Our paper addresses a di erent question, since we can look at individual-level performance measured over time and at the intensive margin in the usage of new technologies.
Finally, this paper is related to the studies of the impact of human resource management on rm performance, such as those by Ichniowski et al. (1997) , Lazear (2000) , Black and Lynch (2001) , and Bartel et al. (2007) . In particular, Ichniowski et al. (1997) nd that human resource practices are observed in bundles, rather than being independently distributed; and second, di erent bundles are associated with substantial di erences in productivity. We nd evidence supporting the hypothesis that being aware of di erent and more productive practices within the same organization can foster increased productivity.
Empirical models and results
The foregoing discussion suggests that the o cers' performances might be a ected by several di erent factors such as branch characteristics and their access to information.
Because the estimation strategy is a ected by data availability, this section begins with a description of the institutional background and the data.
7 Bandiera et al. (2009) employ a similarly ne-grained personnel data to study the e ect of social connections and incentives on productivity, within the fruit picking division of a UK producer of soft fruit. Loan o cers' behavior have been recently studied by Hertzberg et al. (2010) who show that a rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan o cers to borrowers of a commercial bank a ects the o cers' reporting behavior. While they focus on the loan o cers' moral hazard problem in communicating with the headquarters, we analyze how communication among o cers might signi cantly improve their productivity.
The Setting
We analyze the behavior of loan o cers, also called \relationship managers," in the corporate banking division of a major Japanese bank (the Bank) during the two-year period 2006-2008. Located across more than two hundred branches throughout Japan, the o cers' primary tasks are to grant and manage loans to local enterprises. Their performances are assessed every six months and are measured by the percentage of the targets met during the same time. The o cers' performance can be a ected by two main factors. First, there exist regional di erences between branches, such as the local demand for loans and the pro tability of local enterprises. Second, there is some heterogeneity in loan tasks, in fact, while some o cers only deal with the public administration, others need to re-structure more pro table loans or solicit loans from new clients. However, we shall take into account these sources of heterogeneity among o cers.
As explained in the introduction, one of the main di erences between a U.S. bank and the Japanese bank we are analyzing is the incentive system. While end-of-the-year bonuses are extensively adopted in the U.S. banking sector, the Bank rewards its loan o cers by means of promotion. We observe about two hundred instances of promotion in our sample, and we can investigate the e ect that information sharing has on the probability of being promoted. Moreover, in Japan seniority is by far the most important factor that increases promotion probability.
By law, the Bank implements a switching rule as a way to prevent bribery and graft among loan o cers. This regulation obliges loan o cers to change branches every two to ve years, which allows us to disentangle the e ect of an individual branch's working environment from the o cer's ability on productivity. We shall show that headquarters do not relocate o cers based upon their past performance.
In this environment, information sharing among loan o cers has several e ects.
First, allowing o cers to share information lets them better assess the riskiness of client enterprises, or work on more projects at the same time. Second, it might allow the lowability workers to bridge the gap separating them from the most productive ones. Third, high-skill workers might be required to devote a larger fraction of their time helping their colleagues, which could reduce their performance. Fourth, anticipating that this can increase their chances of being promoted, o cers might share their knowledge with others in order to signal their expertise in a particular eld. Our main contribution is to identify and disentangle the di erent e ects that communication has on productivity.
We now discuss the features of this work environment that allow us to assess whether information sharing shapes individual performance.
Data Characteristics
We collected data on performance, communication and information sharing from the corporate banking division of a major Japanese bank. Our primary data source is the bank's personnel records. These include all loan o cers, approximately 2800 people, The dual sets of metrics help to increase accuracy relative to stochastic environmental shocks. As reported by bank executives, the branch managers often assign qualitative scores as a reward for major e ort that did not yield results or discount low e ort that did. The weighted performance of loan o cers along dimensions in the rst column constitutes our objective performance measure, and weighted performance along the second column constitutes our subjective performance measure. Results are robust to using either column.
Our data include all targets, objective results, and subjective scores for each loan In most of the analysis below, we focus our investigation on one dependent variable:
total performance. This is the total score assigned to o cers, representing the weighted sum of performance in each of the di erent categories and including the individual subjective score. It also represents the performance metric used by the bank. We also have information on the number of years the o cer has worked for the Bank, captured by the variable \tenure," and whether he came directly from school with no prior experience (or transferred from another bank), captured by the dummy variable \college." Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our variables of interest, and two things are worth noting. First, loan o cers perform signi cantly di erently, in fact, the mean of our main measure of performance is 52, but the standard deviation is 21. Even if we focus on the employees of the same bank, within the same region and with homogeneous tasks, we still nd that their performance is heterogeneous. Second, loan o cers seem to make great use of the available information within the organization. On average they access 569 documents, post 77 questions and provide 250 answers during a six-month period. Moreover, the standard deviations of all three variables are quite high, ranging from 164 to 282. This will be relevant to interpret estimated coe cients.
Descriptives
Our main hypothesis is that o cers can access the information generated within the Bank in order to improve their performance. In particular, we expect low performers to ask more questions and provide fewer answers. In the remainder of the paper, we present formal evidence to shed light on whether these descriptive results are robust to controlling for other determinants of performance.
In doing so, we make precise the underlying identifying assumptions required to interpret when this evidence is causal and present evidence in support of these identifying assumptions.
Information Sharing and Worker Performance
In this section we explain our approach and the methodology we employ to estimate the e ect of communication and information sharing on performance.
Longitudinal Speci cations
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate the e ect of information sharing on loan o cers employing a longitudinal model that allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity between branches and workers. Next, we take advantage of an anti-corruption law that requires o cers to switch branches every few years to identify the causal e ect of information sharing on performance.
To identify whether information sharing a ects o cer performance, we estimate the following panel-data regression:
where y i;j;k;t is o cer i's log performance in branch j in group k and during term t:
The main variables of interest are I a ; I g ; and I p which capture the number of documents, questions and answers posted by o cer i in branch j. The time xed e ects t account for unobserved shocks that might have a ected both the o cers' performance and their demand for information, such as those arising during a nancial crisis. The group xed e ects k capture permanent productivity di erences across regions and tasks, such as those arising from the di erent clientele and heterogeneity of loan types.
The branch xed e ects j allows us to control for permanent productivity di erences across branches, such as those arising from a more pro table location or a better head manager of the branch. Finally, individual xed e ects i provides the possibility of controlling for innate ability or motivation. We also include the tenure of the loan o cer T i ; when we do not include o cers' xed e ects and the dummy C i which is equal to 1 if the loan o cer joined the bank right after college and equal to 0 if he had previous experience in the banking sector.
We also note that information sharing and performance are unlikely to be identically and independently distributed within a branch. We therefore adopt a conservative strategy when estimating standard errors and allow the disturbance " ijkt to be clustered by o cer throughout. 8
8 Clustering the disturbance terms by branch leads to the standard errors on the parameters of interest being considerably smaller than those we report.
Instrumental Variable Speci cation
To better assess the causal e ect of communication and information sharing on performance, we exploit the mandatory switching of loan o cers across branches. Since there is variation in usage of the information sharing platform across branches, we can construct an instrument based upon the attitude of a given branch toward the new technology. For each loan o cer i; we construct an instrument Z i which is the amount of information accessed in the previous branch excluding o cer i: The choice of this instrument is motivated by the idea that if o cer A worked in a branch where problems are usually resolved within the branch, without attempting to nd solutions elsewhere in the organization, then even when o cer A moves to a di erent branch, he will have been trained to communicate less with other loan o cers. In contrast, if o cer A worked for a branch where the access to information provided by others is encouraged, he will carry that attitude into the new branch. We construct similar instruments for each of our three endogenous variable of interests: the number of documents accessed, the number of questions posted, and the number of answers provided.
Formally, the rst stage for each endogenous variable e 2 fa; g; pg is represented by:
while the second stage is
where we have employed three instruments for the three endogenous variables. The validity of this instrumental-variable procedure relies on the relevance of our instruments and their exogeneity. First, we shall show that our methodology is not a ected by the \weak instrument" problem, in fact, the coe cients in the rst stage regressions for each endogenous variable are highly signi cant, and the F-Test is always above 10, the standard threshold for weak instruments. Second, we have constructed our instruments for o cer i, excluding o cer i from the computation of the information accessed in his branch. This should reduce the correlation between the instrument and o cer i 0 s innate ability. However, since our instruments rely on cultural variations across branches we are afraid that o cer i might have contributed to the branch's culture in the past, which could bias our estimates. We address this concern by restricting attention to larger branches (with more than 50 o cers), for which this possibility is, at least, less likely. Furthermore, tenure signi cantly a ects performance, which can be the result of a learning process within the Bank. At the same time, joining the bank right after college, without any previous experience, is positively correlated with performance. This result can be interpreted as a result of the greater e ort exerted by new employees.
Baseline Results
The main concern with these results is that information sharing and the e ect on performance might be driven by other factors, such as a market downturn, a greater need for information for a speci c local market, or a result of a better performing branch. In order to control for all this unobserved heterogeneity, as shown by column (4), we control for time, group and branch xed e ects. Except for the e ect of the number of answers, the other coe cients are still economically and statistically signi cant.
In column (5) we further control for the interaction of time and branch xed e ects, which shows that the results are robust to this more restrictive speci cation. These results suggest that when o cers increase the number of documents accessed, this has a positive and signi cant e ect on the productivity of the average worker, whereas increasing the number of questions has a negative impact on his performance. The magnitude of these e ects implies that when o cers increase their information access by one standard deviation it increases their performance by eleven percent. Similarly, an increase in the number of questions is associated with a reduction in performance of about ve percent.
A concern with these results is that the estimation might be picking up heterogeneous e ects that are unrelated to information sharing, in particular one of the main factors for which we cannot directly control: o cer's ability. It is plausible that innate ability has a signi cant e ect, which would create a spurious correlation between information sharing and performance. For example, it is likely that a loan o cer who is able to close a higher number of deals and identify the most pro table ones will post fewer questions. Then, observing a negative correlation between the number of questions and the o cers' performance might just be driven by heterogeneous innate ability or di erences in training. Table 6 therefore provides evidence on the e ects of communication and information sharing on the productivity of the same worker. We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and control for individual xed e ects. In accord with the descriptive evidence presented in the previous section, once we control for the individual xed e ects as in column (5), the number of questions is not signi cant anymore. However, we nd an even stronger e ect for the number of documents. This correlation suggests that performance could be signi cantly a ected by the number of documents consulted by the loan o cers, even controlling for individual ability. As highlighted in the introduction, we interpret this as evidence of the possibility that loan o cers know more successful management practices implemented elsewhere in the bank. We instrument this explicitly in Section 5
Who Bene ts the Most from Information?
To explore whether the e ects of information sharing are heterogeneous across loan o cers, we use quantile regression methods to estimate the conditional distribution of the log of performance of loan o cer i in branch j; and group k during the term t, y i;j;k;t , at di erent quantiles, . We therefore estimate the following speci cation:
Quant (y i;j;k;t j ) = 1 I a i;j;k;t + 2 I g i;j;k;t + 3 I p i;j;k;t + X i;j;k;t + " i;j;k;t
All variables are as previously de ned, and bootstrapped standard errors, based on 1000 replications, are calculated throughout. The e ect of information access, gathering, and production on o cers' performance at the th conditional quantile of log performance is measured by the vector : Table 7 reports the estimates of from the speci cation above at various quantiles, controlling for tenure and experience as well as time, group and branch xed e ects.
Two points are of note. First, the e ect of information access is zero for the top two quantiles, and is positive and signi cant at the bottom three quantiles. Second, the e ect of information gathering as measured by the log of the number of questions posted is negative and signi cant for all quantiles. In particular, a ten percent increase in the number of documents predicts a performance increase of at least twenty percent, whereas the same increase in the number of questions posted predicts a decrease of more than twenty-ve percent.
The data suggest that information access increases the performance of loan o cers in the left tail of the productivity distribution, while it has no signi cant e ect on o cers' performance in the right tail of the distribution. These results provide evidence that information transfers might help the low performing o cers learn from the most productive o cers without disrupting the higher performers. That is, the learning e ect dominates the substitution e ect.
This result has two implications. First, it suggests that in a distributed decision polyarchy (see Sah and Stiglitz (1986) ), like the setting investigated here, the agents bene t from communicating with each other due to the replicability of their decisions. For example, two loan o cers serving di erent clients might improve their productivity by sharing information, because the pro tability of these loans is a ected by common factors such as the credit market conditions and the available nancial products. Second, since we do not observe any negative e ects on high-skill agents' productivity, we can conclude that these white-collar workers do not su er from the \information overload" problem identi ed by Van Zandt (2004) . This is probably due to the digital platform's ability to disseminate reusable information without having high performers re-enter answers to the same questions.
Promotion Probability
Since the Bank's incentive system is mainly based upon promotion, it is natural to check whether communication among loan o cers, and its e ect on productivity, are re ected in promotion probability. Although the Bank does not directly incentivize loan o cers to share their information with their colleagues, Bank headquarters might recognize, on the one hand, that a loan o cer has developed valuable expertise in one particular eld, and that he should be rewarded for answers and knowledge spillovers that bene t others. On the other hand, headquarters might also infer a lack of skill from the number of questions posted by the o cer. These signaling e ects should a ect his probability of advancement.
Although headquarters might not directly observe the amount of information demanded and produced by each loan o cer, this data can still be re ected in the promotion probability. In fact, the head manager of each branch, who has a better knowledge of the information generated within the branch, makes recommendations to headquarters regarding which loan o cers deserve promotion. Table 8 presents evidence to support these hypotheses. Speci cally, we observe roughly two hundred promotions in our sample, which allows us to investigate the effect of communication on the probability of being promoted. Estimates show that, as expected given the institutional background, tenure has a positive and signi cant e ect on promotion probability, and it is by far the greatest predictor of promotion.
Column (1) shows that the coe cients on the rst lag of productivity, as captured by the o cers' performance in the previous term, is positive but not signi cant. This means that variations in the number of questions or answers do not pick up promotion e ects otherwise driven by lagged performance. Even controlling for lagged productivity, time, group and branch xed e ects, there exists a positive correlation between the number of answers and the probability of being promoted, while the correlation with the number of questions is negative. These results, even if they cannot be interpreted as causal and de nitive, are consistent with our interpretation. In particular, column (5) shows that there might be an element of signaling when o cers decide to share their information with others, and an element of skill-level disclosure when they ask for information.
Providing others with relevant information increases, in fact, the probability of being promoted, even if it has no signi cant or direct e ect on performance, as described in the previous section.
E ect of Switching
Up to now we have found evidence that communication and information sharing might help the low-performing o cers acquire the necessary knowledge to improve their performance. If this is true, we should then expect o cers to signi cantly increase their access to the available information when they switch branches. A loan o cer might, for example, start working in a di erent environment, with di erent existing customers, and a di erent local credit market, which should have a signi cant impact on his demand for information. The switchers might then require information about the reliability of the customers and the conditions o ered by competitors. We observe 618 loan o cers who switched branches, as prescribed by the anti-corruption law, after two years of experience in the same branch.
As a rst step, we investigate whether or not Bank headquarters relocates o cers to di erent branches based upon their performance. On the one hand, it might be that in order to improve the productivity of a branch with below-average productivity, the Bank might nd it optimal to allocate the best o cers to the branches that need to improve their productivity. On the other hand, the high-performing o cers might be rewarded by being allocated to the \best" branches. Figure 2 favors the latter case. It displays the slightly positive relation between the mean o cers' performance before the switch and the productivity of the branch where they work after the switch. This means that the Bank does not employ the switching rule to strategically locate o cers across branches to improve branch productivity. Table 9 reports coe cient estimates on job rotation relative to document consumption { indicator variable \switch" is equal to one when a loan o cer moves from one branch to another. As highlighted by columns (1) and (2) the results are consistent with the learning hypothesis. Even controlling for time, group, branch and individual xed e ects, the coe cient is positive and both statistically and economically signicant. This suggests that switching might be an important determinant of the demand for information. Intuitively, the less-experienced o cers would try to acquire a greater amount of information, as shown by the coe cients on tenure, negative but insigni cant, and the coe cient on college, which is instead positive and signi cant.
However, if the demand for information is driven by a temporary need driven by the new environment, we should observe a diminishing e ect of switching over time.
Columns (3) and (4) investigate this issue, presenting the estimate for another indicator variable, \after switch," which equals one for all terms after the switch. The e ect is still positive, but no longer signi cant. This con rms the hypothesis that switching has only a short-run impact on the demand for information.
Since we have identi ed a signi cant e ect of switching on communication, it is now natural to investigate the level of costs associated with the application of this anticorruption law. In particular, we can investigate if switching has a positive or negative e ect on the loan o cers' performance. On the one hand, switching might result in the o cers exerting more e ort during the rst few months of the new appointment to signal their ability. On the other, loan o cers might have acquired some speci c knowledge about the type of rms and market conditions in the previous branch, which suggests that after the switching they would need more time to learn work practices in other environments.
Table 10 presents evidence that strongly supports the latter hypothesis. As shown by columns (3) and (4), switching has a negative and signi cant e ect on performance.
Moreover, this e ect is even stronger for longer-tenured o cers, as suggested by the negative coe cient on the interaction term between the indicator variable and the o cers'
tenure. This means that even if loan o cers might tend to work more when they are forced to change branch, the overall impact on their performance is negative. As in the case of the demand for information we should expect a decreasing e ect of switching on the o cers' performance over time. Column (5) shows the coe cient estimates on the indicator variable that accounts for all the time after the change of branch. Although still signi cantly negative, its magnitude is diminished. 9
The last two columns (6) and (7) assure that these results are robust to the inclusion of individual xed e ects. Overall this evidence suggests that implementing a switching rule as a way to prevent bribery and corruption can impose high costs. In particular our estimates suggest that some specialized human capital is destroyed when a loan o cer switches from one branch to another. In contrast to the existing literature on worker displacement (which investigates the e ect of layo s on earnings), we are able to estimate the e ect of turnover directly on performance. Moreover, we have the advantage of analyzing a sample of white-collar workers that switch locations within the same organization, and with the same tasks. This guarantees that the negative shock to o cers' performance is not driven by the relocation to a di erent rm or to a job that requires another set of quali cations.
One problem with the interpretation of these results might come from the possibility of endogenous adjustment of performance targets after the switch. Incoming o cers might be assigned less desirable loan portfolios. Yet, if bias were present, less attractive loan portfolios would reduce performance, making the positive e ects of access a fortiori a stronger result. Downward bias would be present if our performance measures were the absolute results achieved by the loan o cers, instead, our performance measure is the score assigned to the loan o cers based upon the percentage of the targets met aggregated across all relevant dimensions. Then, even an endogenous change in targets is re ected in our dependent variable without necessarily biasing our results.
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Up to now, the evidence presented strongly suggests the existence of a signi cant e ect of communication on o cers' performance. Speci cally, there is substitution between the demand for information and the innate ability of o cers. Moreover, low performers or o cers who just switched to a new branch signi cantly increase their demand for information. We can now address a natural endogeneity problem that can arise in our context. The loan o cer who is facing a market contraction, for example, can decide to acquire more information in order to improve his performance. Although in the previous estimates we have accounted for a variety of unobserved shocks, with the inclusion of a set of xed e ects, we now try to address this endogeneity issue in order to understand whether we can interpret the results as causal or not.
Since we do not have data before adoption of the new technology, which allowed for is captured by the inclusion of the branch xed e ects, which should control for unobserved cultural heterogeneity.
information to be shared, we are not able to run a natural experiment to understand the e ect of information sharing on o cers' performance. Nevertheless, we are able to address this issue by employing the anti-corruption law as a source of exogenous variation. For each o cer i who switched from branch j at time t to branch j 0 at time t + 1; we use the number of documents (as well as questions and answers) accessed in the branch j as an instrument for the number of documents (and the number of questions and answers) that o cer i had access to in branch j 0 at time t + 1: That is, we exploit the variation in branch attitudes toward information sharing to determine the e ect of communication on performance. Then, we shall use the cross-sectional variation among switchers to identify the e ect of communication on performance. Table 11 presents the rst stage estimate for each one of the endogenous variables.
The rst column reports the coe cient estimates of our instrument for the number of documents, which shows that both the coe cient (positive and statistically signi cant at the one percent level) and the F-test (above 10) strongly suggest that our instruments are not weak. Columns (2) and (3) present the rst stage instruments for the number of questions and the number of answers. As for the documents, our instruments seem to signi cantly a ect the demand for information. Intuitively, for all three variables of interest, tenure has a negative and signi cant e ect, which con rms that even restricting attention only to the switchers, the more experienced people demand less information.
Given the small sample of switchers we are not able to control for branch xed e ects, but we include both time and group xed e ects. Table 12 presents the ordinary least-square estimates restricted to the switchers sample and the instrumental-variable estimates. The coe cient on the number of documents is negative and not signi cant for all the OLS estimates while positive and highly signi cant for the IV estimates. This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of our substitution hypothesis, that is, high-ability o cers tend to seek out less information than their colleagues. The magnitude is also interesting, in fact; the most conservative speci cation in column (6) suggests an e ect of about ten percent on performance. This means that incentivizing the usage of the information produced by others within the same organization might actually result in a signi cant improvement in productivity.
Interestingly, Black and Lynch (1996) found that a 10% rise in average education, roughly one year of schooling, led to an 8:5% productivity increase in manufacturing and a 12:7% increase in non-manufacturing. The ten percent gain we nd in banking therefore appears comparable to just under one year of education.
Our second variable of interest, the number of questions, has a negative e ect on performance in both the OLS and IV estimates. This is consistent with the previous results, and suggests that even the exogenous variation in the number of questions negatively a ects performance. The magnitude is higher for our IV estimates than in the OLS results, ranging from ve percent to almost twenty percent. This con rms the substitution between o cers' ability and the number of questions posted.
Finally, in contrast to the panel estimates presented above, the number of answers has a signi cant, positive e ect on performance. These estimates show that the exogenous variation in the number of answers has an impact on performance. However, the coe cients on both the number of questions and answers should be interpreted carefully because, based on the panel analysis of the previous section, we know that these might not be robust to the inclusion of individual xed e ects.
The main concern with our instrument is that it might fail the exogeneity restriction.
In particular, one might imagine that even if we do not include o cer i's demand for information in the construction of our instrument, he might have had an e ect on the cultural attitude of the branch regarding information sharing. However, this e ect should be more pronounced for small branches than for larger branches. Table 13 shows that even when we restrict attention to the subsample of branches with more than 50 loan o cers, we nd the same results. That is, the number of documents consulted and the number of answers provided positively a ect performance, while the impact of the number of questions is negative. As expected given the lower number of observations, the estimates are signi cant only at the ve-and ten-percent level in the most conservative speci cation shown in column (6). However, both the magnitudes and the signs are consistent with the previous results.
Discussion
We devote the next section to implications of our empirical ndings for three strands of literature. In the rst section, we consider theoretical and empirical results from tournament research that bear on information sharing incentives and thus group productivity.
We then analyze human capital ine ciencies generated by the mandatory-transfer regulation. Finally, we interpret our ndings in the context of existing studies on relational banking.
Information Sharing and Tournaments
If information sharing a ects productivity, an organizationsl design question arises as to how promotion incentives interact with sharing incentives. Tournament theory, as modeled by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , models promotions as a relative game, that is, prizes depend on relative rather than absolute performance. The compensation at one level of the rm, in addition to motivating individuals at that level, motivates those at lower levels.
These basic ideas of tournament theory have been extended in numerous ways. 10
In particular, Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) consider how the potential for collusion, sabotage, or other forms of non-cooperative behavior counter the incentive value generated by promotions and tournaments. Chan (1996) suggests that handicapping insiders in the tournament, with respect to external hires, can help mitigate the possibility of in uence activity or sabotage. Then, the existing theoretical literature has recognized the costs and ine ciencies generated by the implementation of a promotion-based incentive system. Prendergast (1999) discusses the possibility that incentives from promotion methods give rise to dysfunctional behavioral responses and that companies adjust management compensation to address some of the negative responses from promotion incentives.
Empirically, many studies have con rmed these predictions from tournament theory.
Using a survey of Australian rms, for example, Drago and Garvey (1998) show that individuals are less helpful and work harder when promotion incentives are strong. This seems to suggest that workers incentivized via promotions are less willing to cooperate with each other, because the e ort to help others may reduce their own probability of being promoted.
In contrast to these observations, we nd that loan o cers intensively cooperate with each other, sharing their knowledge and in doing so they indirectly improve their colleagues' performance. This result seems to suggest that it is possible to reconcile competitive promotion incentives with cooperation in knowledge-sharing. We attribute this novel result to the relative weight placed on tenure in Japanese banking and to the dual role of posting questions and providing answers. On the one hand, sharing information with competitors can increase their chances of promotion via increased performance.
On the other hand, helping others signals skill and is recognized and rewarded by the organization. This explains the strong correlations presented in Table 8 .
The Cost of Anti-Corruption Regulation
Corruption is recognized as a driving factor in persistent poverty in less-developed countries but also a source of ine ciency and rent extraction in developed countries. The 10 See Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a survey of this literature.
World Bank ranks the ght against corruption as a top priority for poverty reduction (WorldBank 2006) . Much theoretical work, since Becker and Stigler (1974) and Tirole (1986) , focused on understanding the incentives and the constraints within corruptible bureaucracies. 11
Existing evidence, however, on anti-corruption policies shows that corruption is fought and defeated with very simple tools. For example, Klitgaard (1991) This gives rise to a more fundamental question: if these levers for eliminating corruption are within the choice set of governments, why are they not more often implemented? A possible answer is suggested by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) . They identify a trade-o between market failures and government failures. That is, since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, the second-best intervention may involve tolerating a certain fraction of bureaucratic corruption. Then, government failures may indicate an unavoidable price of dealing with market failures.
In our setting we do not directly observe corruption, but we are able to quantify the cost associated with the anti-corruption regulation. If the implementation of the rotation rule has been e cient, the social cost of enduring corruption should be higher than the banking ine ciencies generated by the remedial regulation. Then, we can infer the costs of corruption by analyzing the productivity loss associated with the o cers' relocation. As a rst step, we collected loan o cers' performance in dollar terms. On average each o cer generated almost four million dollars in bank gross pro t every six months. Then, as is shown by Table 10 , and holding other factors constant, switching reduces performance by more than 10%: This translates to a reduction in pro ts of 939,200 dollars a year for each o cer transferred.
From this, we can conclude that in two years the Bank passed up more than 200 million dollars due to the adoption of this anti-corruption law. Since our data span only two years, we cannot analyze potential long term productivity gains that might arise from exposure to multiple branches. Yet, if corruption regulation has been optimally implemented, this estimate would constitute a reasonable bound on the amount of corruption avoided due to regulatory intervention.
11 See Banerjee and Mullainathan (2009) for a recent survey of this literature.
Relational Banking
Boot ( The possibility for a bank to build a long-term relationship with a client enables collection of soft information that is otherwise unavailable. The bond markets and the rating agencies collect nancial disclosures, accounting reports, and default histories which can be considered hard information. Banks collect information on the client's ability and his honesty, which cannot be easily communicated to others Petersen and Rajan (1994) . Stein (2002) argues that larger, more hierarchical banks, where the decision maker is further from the information collector, are more likely to rely on hard information, because such organizations are expected to be less e cient at making relationship loans.
Information in a large bank is potentially collected by one individual or group and a decision made by another. Thus the decisions must be made on information that is easy to transmit across physical or organizational distances. Consistent with this intuition, Berger et al. (2005) nd that larger banks are more likely to lend to more customers at a greater distance and communicate with the borrower more impersonally, i.e. by mail or phone as opposed to face-to-face.
Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we show that information sharing among relationship managers allows a large bank, like the one analyzed here, to build long-term relationships with clients by reducing the costs of communicating the soft information collected. The platform used by the Bank allows o cers to store the relevant information about diverse clients and to e ectively communicate this to their colleagues.
Second, we highlight the dark side of relationship banking, the possibility that loan o cers could be bribed by clients. The bank has adopted the two-year-switching rule to prevent the relationship between clients and o cers degenerating into suboptimal decisions from the point of view of the organization and society.
Concluding Remarks
To address the question of whether access to information produced and gathered within the same organization a ects the performance of information workers, we examined two years of micro data from a major Japanese bank. Data include all accesses to an information-sharing platform, objective and subjective performance measures, and all promotions and job rotations among more than 2,800 loan o cers. Exogenous legal requirements, aimed at curbing corruption by compulsory o ce rotation, permit analysis of loan o cer performance in di erent settings.
We nd that a standard deviation increase in the number of shared documents predicts an 11% rise in output, in speci cations with time, location and individual xed e ects. This is comparable to just under one year of education among non-manufacturing workers Black and Lynch (1996) . Quantile regression estimates suggest that communication and information sharing greatly bene ts the low-performance o cers. In fact, questions are more salient among workers of lesser ability and, when productivity gains exist, they appear strongly on the left tail of the distribution, at the 10 th and 25 th percentiles, but do not appear on the right tail, at the 75 th and 90 th percentiles.
We observe over 200 instances of job promotion. Tenure within the bank is by far the strongest predictor, while lagged productivity is not signi cant. Loan o cer answers are associated with faster promotion while loan o cer questions are associated with slower promotion. These ndings are consistent with a signaling hypothesis on behalf of high-ability workers, who distinguish themselves from low-ability workers by providing answers in order to demonstrate their expertise and signal higher ability.
We also observe 618 instances of loan o cers switching branches as a result of an anti-corruption law. This exogenous shock provides an opportunity to observe the same knowledge worker in di erent contexts. With this instrument, and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity over time and branch, a standard deviation increase in shared document consumption boosts productivity by at least 10%. These results appear to be causal.
The di erence between OLS and IV speci cations provides evidence of the substitution hypothesis: high-ability o cers demand less information than low-ability o cers, while low-ability o cers can compensate for low independent performance by consuming information provided by others. We also nd that switching jobs signi cantly reduces Notes: entries are the summary statistics for our main variables of interest. "Total Performance" is the sum of the objective and the subjective performance measures. "Tenure" is the number of years managers worked for the Bank. On average each manager obtains a score of 52 out of 100, downloads 569 documents, post 77 questions, and provides 250 answers over a six-month period. Overall there are 2451 managerbranch-term observations. Notes: *** denotes signi cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The standard errors clustered by manager are reported in parenthesis. Performance is measured as the total score assigned to a manager in a given branch. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of total performance. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. The time period is 2006-2008. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and branch xed e ects. As additional controls Column (5) include time dummies interacted with a branch dummies. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of total performance. The time period is 2006-2008. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and branch xed e ects. As additional controls Column (2)-(5) include managers xed e ects. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of total performance. All speci cations control for time, group, and branch xed e ects. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. All columns estimated by probit maximum likelihood. The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan o cer is promoted. All speci cations include "Number Documents" which is never signi cant. "Lag Productivity" is the managers' total performance recorded in the previous term. We include all the observations for which we have data on the managers' position inside the Bank. All columns include "Tenure" as control variable. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Additional controls include time, group, and branch xed e ects. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log number of documents downloaded in a six-month period. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and branch xed e ects. As additional controls Column (2) and (4) include individual xed e ects. "Switch" is a dummy variable equal to one only in the rst term after the manager's relocation to another branch. "After Switch" equals one for all the terms after the transfer. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of total performance. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, group and branch xed e ects. As additional controls Column (6) and (7) include individual xed e ects. "Switch" is a dummy variable equal to one only in the rst term after the manager's relocation to another branch. An interaction term between "Switch" and "Tenure" is included in columns (2) and (4). "After Switch" equals one for all the terms after the transfer. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. The dependent variables are the number of documents, answers and questions in a six-month period after the relocation. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, and group xed e ects. "Documents Prev Branch" is the average number of documents consulted within the branch before the relocation. Similarly for "Answers Prev Branch" and "Questions Prev Branch". "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Overall we observe in our sample 618 managers switching branch. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. In all columns the dependent variable is the manager's total performance. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, and group xed e ects. The estimation method in columns (1), (3), and (5) is OLS. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are estimated using 2SLS. In both cases, we restrict attention to our subsample of 618 managers switching branch.
Notice that, albeit signi cant, we do not interpret causally the e ect of the "number of questions" and the "number of answers" on performance. In fact, as shown by the results in table 6, these e ects would disappear if individual xed e ects were added to the speci cation. Notes: * signi cant at 10%; ** signi cant at 5%; *** signi cant at 1%. In all columns the dependent variable is the manager's total performance. Large branches are those with more than 50 employees. "College" is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager joined the Bank directly after college. Standard errors in brackets under coe cients in all columns are clustered by individual (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). Columns include a full set of time, and group xed e ects. The estimation method in columns (1), (3), and (5) is OLS. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are estimated using 2SLS. In both cases, we restrict attention to our subsample of 240 managers switching branch.
Notice that, albeit signi cant, we do not interpret causally the e ect of the "number of questions" on performance. In fact, as shown by the results in table 6, this e ect would disappear if individual xed e ects were added to the speci cation.
